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(202)  874-5250. Abstract:  Failures,  intra-company  mergers  of  affiliate  banks,  and  inter-company  mergers 
and  acquisitions  together  account  for  the  disappearance  of  more  than  4000  bank  charters  since 
1987.  This  process  of  consolidation  is  beneficial  if  it drives  inefficient  banking  organizations 
from  the  market  and  if  it  facilitates  increased  efficiency  in  the  banking  organizations  that 
survive.  In  this  paper,  we  consider  the  findings  reported  in  previous  studies  and  present 
results  from  new  research  of  our  own  in  an  attempt  to  determine  the  impact  of  consolidation 
on  banking  industry  efficiency.  New  evidence  presented  here  suggests  that  failed  banks  are 
significantly  less  efficient  than  their  peers  5 to  6 years  prior  to  failure  and  that  this 
performance  differential  often  becomes  evident  before  the  appearance  of  major  loan  quality 
problems.  Consistent  with  existing  evidence,  new  evidence  drawn  from  an  event  study 
indicates  that  intra-company  consolidation  is  likely  to  have  a  small  but  significantly  positive 
impact  on  holding  company  efficiency  and  profitability.  Finally,  both  new  and  existing 
research  on  inter-company  bank  mergers  finds  that  many  of  these  transactions  have  a 
potential  for  efficiency  gains  that  is  not  systematically  exploited  postmerger,  results  that 
suggest  a non-efficiency  motivation  for  bank  mergers.  When  considered  together,  the  results 
presented  here  suggest  that  efficiency  is  a useful  indicator  of  a bank’s  competitive  viability, 
and  that  intra-  and  inter-company  mergers,  at  least  within  states,  afford  opportunities  for 
banking  firms  to  enhance  their  efficiency.  The  results  also  demonstrate  that  regulatory 
restrictions  on  geographic  expansion  and  organizational  form  impose  costs  on  banks  that 
should  be  consciously  considered  by  policy  makers. From  1986  through  the  end  of  1993,  the  number  of  commercial  banks  in  the  U.  S. 
declined  by  over  20  percent.  This  consolidation  occurred  via  three  types  of  transactions. 
Bank  regulators  closed  1,021  banks  due  to  insolvency,  another  2,043  banks  were  converted 
to  branches  in  corporate  reorganizations  of  multibank  holding  companies  (MBHCs),  and 
1.175  banks  were  purchased  by  other  banks.  ’  In  this  article,  we  investigate  whether,  and  to 
what  extent,  each  of  these  three  channels  of  consolidation  has  enhanced  the  efficiency  of  the 
banking  industry. 
Two  primary  factors  precipitated  the  consolidation  of  the  banking  industry. 
Geographic  branching  restrictions  that  had  supported  an  artificially  large  number  of  banks 
were  lifted,  and  changes  in  technology  and  deregulation  intensified  the  competition  facing 
banks  from  nonbank  financial  institutions  as  well  as  from  foreign  and  domestic  banks.  These 
forces  of  change  continue  today.  Most  legal  impediments  to  intra-state  branching  have  been 
removed,  barriers  to  interstate  banking  continue  to  fall,  and  legislation  to  allow  branching 
across  state  lines  looms  on  the  horizon.  Mutual  funds,  brokerage  firms,  insurance 
companies,  mortgage  companies,  finance  companies,  and  the  commercial  paper  markets  all 
continue  to  make  inroads  into  traditional  banking  markets. 
Given  the  sheer  magnitude  of  consolidation  in  the  banking  industry  over  the  past 
decade,  the  industry’s  overall  efficiency  is  likely  to  have  improved.  When  competitive 
rivalry  intensifies,  firms  that  respond  by  becoming  more  efficient--reducing  unit  costs,  pricing 
products  and  services  more  intelligently,  and/or  improving  product  quality--increase  their 
chances  of  survival.  Firms  that  do  not  evolve  with  the  industry  typically  fail  or  are  acquired 
’ There  were  also  1,091  new  bank  charters  issued  during  this  time  period.  See  Nolle  (1994)  for  a  more 
thorough  description  of  the  banking  industry  consolidation  of  the  1980s  and  1990s. by  other  firms.  Average  efficiency  in  the  industry  improves  simply  through  attrition,  and  is 
likely  to  improve  further  as  surviving  firms  look  for  ways  to  compete  more  effectively  in  the 
more  rivalrous  environment.  Assuming  that  the  antitrust  statutes  and  lower  barriers  to  entry 
prevent  anti-competitive  conduct,  consumers  will  benefit  from  lower  prices  and  improved 
quality. 
It  is  likely  that  each  of  the  three  major  channels  of  banking  consolidation  has 
enhanced  industry  efficiency.  All  else  equal,  banks  that  are  operated  inefficiently  should  be 
more  likely  to  fail  than  are  efficiently  operated  banks--if  so,  failure  will  reallocate  scarce 
resources  toward  banks  that  will  use  them  more  efficiently.  As  legal  restrictions  on  intra- 
state  branching  have  been  removed,  MBHCs  can  opt  to  reorganize  by  merging  their  affiliate 
banks--transactions  that  can  produce  cost  savings  through  improvements  in  X-efficiency  or 
elimination  of  duplicate  overhead.  Similarly,  inter-firm  bank  mergers  can  present 
opportunities  to  eliminate  duplication,  and  in  addition  can  allow  banks  to  achieve  more 
optimal  size,  to  better  diversify  across  products  or  geographic  markets,  or  to  generate  profits 
by  improving  the  operations  at  inefficient  target  banks. 
Each  of  the  first  three  sections  of  this  paper  focusses  on  one  of  the  three  channels  of 
banking  consolidation.  We  begin  each  of  these  sections  by  examining  the  existing  literature 
for  evidence  linking  efficiencies  with  consolidation,  then  complement  the  existing  evidence 
with  results  of  our  own  research.  The  research  results  provide  a backdrop  for  the  final 
section  of  the  paper,  in  which  we  pose  and  attempt  to  answer  two  thematic  questions:  “What 
should  banks  do?”  and  “What  should  bank  regulators  do?”  We  discuss  how  banks  might 
consider  the  research  findings  as  they  plot  their  strategies  for  the  future,  and  how  bank 
2 regulators  might  best  react  to  the  changing  structure  of  the  financial  services  industry. 
Special  attention  is  given  to  the  impact  that  interstate  branching--the  most  likely  and  farthest 
reaching  regulatory  change  in  the  near  future--is  likely  to  have  on  the  patterns  of  industry 
consolidation  and  efficiency. 
1.  Efficiency  and Bank  Failure 
About  one-quarter  of  the  commercial  banks  that  have  disappeared  since  1986  failed.’ 
Logic  suggests  that  inefficiently  operated  banks  are  more  likely  to  fail  than  are  efficiently 
operated  banks.  If  this  is  true,  attrition  should  improve  the  overall  efficiency  of  the  banking 
industry  over  time.  Furthermore,  as  failure  redirects  valuable  resources--including  branch 
locations,  deposits,  and  relationships  with  credit-worthy  borrowers--from  failed  banks  to 
surviving  banks,  the  remaining  portion  of  the  industry  should  become  stronger. 
The  most  obvious  characteristic  of  failed  banks  is  not  poor  operating  efficiency, 
however,  but  an  increased  volume  of  nonperforming  loans.  Nonperforming  loans  in  failed 
banks  have  typically  been  associated  with  regional  macroeconomic  problems.  However,  not 
all  banks  in  these  troubled  economic  regions  failed.  Why  did  some  banks  become  insolvent 
during  these  episodes,  while  others  survived? 
A  1988  study  of  bank  failure  performed  by  the  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of  the 
Currency  concluded  that  “the  difference  between  the  failed  banks  and  those  that  remained 
* In  this  paper,  failure  refers  to  a bank  that  has  been  declared  insolvent  by  its  primary  regulator.  The  FDIC 
seizes  failed  banks  and  disposes  of  their  performing  assets,  in  most  cases  arranging  for  a solvent  bank  to 
purchase  the  assets  and  assume  the  liabilities  of  the  failed  institution. 
3 healthy  or  recovered  from  problems  was  the  caliber  of  management.  ‘I3 Based  on  these 
findings,  we  might  construct  the  following  “management  quality”  theory  of  bank  failure. 
Superior  managers  not  only  run  their  banks  in  a cost  efficient  fashion,  and  thus  generate  large 
profits  relative  to  their  peers,  but  also  impose  better  loan  underwriting  and  monitoring 
standards  than  their  peers,  which  result  in  better  credit  quality.  Hence,  we  should  observe 
high  (low)  levels  of  cost  efficiency,  and  low  (high)  levels  of  nonperforming  loans,  in  the 
same  banks.  Efficiently  run  banks  should  be  less  likely  to  fail  during  economic  downturns 
because  of  larger  capital  cushions,  more  certain  streams  of  interest  income,  and  lower  cost 
structures  relative  to  their  peers. 
Testing  this  theory  is  difficult,  because  both  inefficient  operations  and  high  levels  of 
nonperforming  loans  drive-up  expenses.  Aside  from  not  producing  any  income  for  the  bank, 
nonperforming  loans  can  require  banks  to  increase  monitoring  activities,  incur  loan  workout 
expenses,  or  incur  expenses  in  order  to  sell  or  manage  seized  property.  If  a  failed  bank 
exhibited  unusually  high  expense  levels  prior  to  failure,  it  is  not  immediately  clear  whether 
this  is primarily  due  to  the  administration  of  nonperforming  loans,  or  whether  a  large  portion 
of  these  “excess”  expenses  were  due  to  inefficient  operations. 
1.1  Recent  empirical  evidence 
Studies  of  cost  efficiency  in  banks  find  that  the  most  efficient  banks  have  a  substantial 
cost  advantage  over  the  most  inefficient  banks.  After  controlling  for  inter-bank  differences  in 
output  mix,  input  prices,  size,  organizational  form,  and  regulatory  constraints,  these  studies 
3 See  Office  of  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency,  Bank  Fuilure:  An  Evaluation  of the Factors  Contributing  to the 
Failure  of National  Banks  (1988). 
4 typically  find  that  the  average  bank  incurs  expenses  that  are  between  20  to  30  percent  higher 
than  those  incurred  by  its  most  efficient  peers.4  Expense  differentials  this  large  lead  one  to 
expect  a higher  rate  of  failure  for  cost  inefficient  banks. 
This  expectation  is  supported  by  the  empirical  literature  on  bank  failure.  Berger  and 
Humphrey  (1991)  identified  the  worst  25  percent  of  banks  in  terms  of  unit  costs  in  1980  and, 
using  a  simple  univariate  analysis,  showed  that  41  percent  of  these  banks  had  failed  by  1990. 
Multivariate  analyses  tend  to  find  similar  results.’  Among  the  variables  typically  included  in 
multivariate  models  are  simple  accounting  measures  of  operating  efficiency  (e.g.,  the  ratio  of 
overhead  expenses  to  total  assets)  and  measures  of  nonperforming  loans  (e.g.,  the  ratio  of 
nonperforming  loans  to  total  loans).  Studies  typically  find  that  both  of  these  variables  are 
positively  related  to  the  likelihood  of  failure.  It  is  important  to  note,  however,  that  the 
expense  ratios  in  these  models  do  not  differentiate  between  excess  expenses  due  to 
nonperforming  loans  and  excess  expenses  due  to  operating  inefficiency. 
Recent  extensions  of  the  bank  failure  literature  replace  the  accounting  measures  of 
cost  efficiency  with  econometrically  estimated  measures  that  control  for  inter-bank  differences 
in  output  mix,  input  prices,  size,  organizational  form,  and  regulatory  constraints.  When 
measured  in  this  fashion,  cost  inefficiency  is  usually  referred  to  as  X-inefficiency,  a concept 
originated  by  Leibenstein  (1966).6  A  variety  of  mathematical  and  statistical  techniques  have 
been  used  to  measure  X-inefficiency  in  banks,  most  of  which  compute  the  difference  between 
4 Berger,  Hunter,  and  Timme  (1993)  and  Evanoff  and  Israilevich  (1991)  contain  good  reviews  of  this  literature. 
5 Demiguc-Kunt  (1989)  reviews  this  literature. 
6 Leibenstein  coined  the  term  to  describe  cost  overruns  specifically  attributable  to  management  laxity  at  firms 
with  market  power.  For  a discussion  of  X-efficiency  in  banking  see  Berger  and  Humphrey  (1992). 
5 a bank’s  actual  costs  and  a  “best  practices”  cost  function,  i.e.,  the  lower  bound  of  costs 
attainable  only  by  the  most  cost  efficient  banks. 
Recent  studies  of  bank  failure  have  found  positive  relationships  between  the 
probability  of  failure  and  X-inefficiency.  Wheelock  and  Wilson  (1994)  use  a  stochastic  cost 
frontier  approach  to  estimate  cost  inefficiency,  and  find  that  this  measure  of  cost  inefficiency 
was  a  significant  determinant  of  failure  for  Kansas-chartered  banks  in  the  1920s.  Coyne, 
McManus,  and  Stagliano  (1993)  use  data  envelopment  analysis  to  measure  output  efficiency 
and  find  that  small  banks  (average  loans  of  $33  million)  that  failed  in  1989  averaged  68 
percent  of  possible  efficiency,  while  similar  banks  that  did  not  fail  averaged  76  percent  of 
possible  efficiency.  Barr  and  Siems  (1994)  also  use  data  envelopment  analysis  to  measure 
efficiency,  and  find  that  banks  with  between  $30  million  and  $300  million  of  assets  that  failed 
in  1988  averaged  70  percent  of  efficiency  one  year  prior  to  failure,  compared  to  an  average 
of  82  percent  for  banks  that  survived.  Lutton,  DeYoung,  and  Becher  (1994)  use  a  thick  cost 
frontier  approach  to  measure  the  cost  efficiency  of  every  cormnercial  bank  in  1986,  and  find 
that  this  measure  was  a  significant  determinant  of  whether  these  banks  had  failed  prior  to  the 
end  of  1992. 
Although  the  X-efficiency  measures  used  in  these  models  are  an  improvement  over  the 
overhead  ratios  used  in  earlier  models,  failure  prediction  models  that  employ  them  may  not 
be  separating  the  impact  of  excess  expenses  due  to  the  administration  of  nonperforming  loans 
from  the  impact  of  excess  expenses  due  to  operating  inefficiency.  Mester  (1994)  attempts  to 
separate  the  expense  of  loan  monitoring  activities  from  other  cost  inefficiencies  by  including  a 
nonperforming  loan  ratio  directly  in  her  stochastic  cost  frontier  model.  However,  Mester 
6 suggests  that  nonperforming  loans  should  be  negatively  related  to  cost  inefficiency  (she  fails 
to  find  a  statistically  significant  relationship),  hypothesizing  that  loans  are  less  likely  to 
become  nonperforming  when  loan  monitoring  is  intensive. 
1.2  In&Ecient  operations,  underwriting,  and monitoring 
We  took  a  straightforward  approach  to  determine  whether  cost  inefficient  banks  are 
also  more  likely  to  make  bad  lending  decisions.  We  assembled  a  sample  of  278  commercial 
banks  that  failed  in  either  1990,  1991,  or  1992  and  were  at  least  six  years  old  when  they 
failed.  Two  pieces  of  information  for  each  bank--a  measure  of  nonperforming  loans  and  a 
measure  of  cost  efficiency--were  examined  in  each  of  the  six  years  leading  up  to  its  failure. 
The  intensity  of  nonperforming  loans  was  measured  for  each  bank  by  its  ratio  of  noncurrent 
loans  to  total  loans  (NC).7  Cost  efficiency  was  estimated  using  a  thick  cost 
that  yields  an  index  of  cost  efficiency  (Xindex)  that  is uniformly  distributed 
the  most  cost  inefficient  bank)  and  one  (for  the  most  cost  efficient  bank).8 
frontier  approach 
between  zero  (for 
The  banks  were  separated  into  two  groups:  160  failed  banks  in  southwestern  states 
(Texas,  Louisiana,  and  Oklahoma)  and  118  failed  banks  from  the  other  47  states.  Each  of 
these  two  groups  was  separated  further  by  year  of  failure,  resulting  in  six  subsamples.  For 
each  of  the  six  years  leading  up  to  failure,  the  mean  values  of  NC  and  Xindex  for  the  failed 
’  To  qualify  as  noncurrent,  a  loan  must  have  been  nonperforming  (i.e.,  payments  have  not  been  made)  for  at 
least  90  consecutive  days. 
* For  each  year  in  the  analysis,  a thick  cost  frontier  was  estimated  using  a  standard  multi-product  translog  cost 
model  and  a  sample  of  cost  efficient  commercial  banks.  (These  banks  were  chosen  based  on  the  residual  values 
derived  for  them  when  the  cost  model  was  first  estimated  for  the  entire  population  of  commercial  banks.)  The 
output  vector  included  loans,  securities,  transactions  deposits,  and  fee-based  income.  Measures  of  X-efficiency 
were  derived  annually  for  each  bank  based  on  the  distance  between  its  actual  unit  costs  and  its  unit  costs  had  it 
been  able  to  operate  on  the  estimated  frontier.  See  DeYoung  (1994)  for  a thorough  description  of  the  model. banks  were  compared  to  mean  values  of  NC  and  Xindex  for  all  other  banks  in  their 
respective  regions.  The  results  for  all  six  subsamples  are  shown  in  Tables  la  and  lb. 
On  average,  all  six  groups  of  failed  banks  were  significantly  less  cost  efficient  than 
their  nonfailing  peers  in  the  year  just  prior  to  failure.  Mean  Xindex  ranged  between  the  7th 
and  the  18th  efficiency  percentiles  (i.e.,  between  .07  and  .18)  for  these  banks  the  year  before 
they  failed.  This  extremely  low  level  of  cost  efficiency  just  prior  to  failure  is  likely  related 
to  the  extremely  high  levels  of  NC  just  prior  to  failure,  which  was  significantly  higher  than 
the  regional  averages  in  all  six  of  the  groups.  Judging  from  this  one-year-to-failure  evidence 
alone,  it  is  not  possible  to  disentangle  excess  expenses  due  to  poor  operating  efficiency  from 
the  costs  of  administering  problem  loans. 
There  is  clear  evidence  that  failed  banks  were  also  less  cost  efficient  than  their 
nonfailing  peers  several  years  before  failure.  Three  years  prior  to  failure,  mean  Xindex  was 
significantly  less  than  average  in  all  six  groups.  In  general,  Xindex  began  to  gradually 
diverge  from  regional  means  between  four  to  six  years  before  failure.  The  two  exceptions 
are  the  1992  Southwest  and  the  1990  nonsouthwest  subsamples,  in  which  mean  Xindex  was 
already  significantly  below  the  regional  mean  six  years  prior  to  failure. 
Noncurrent  loans  also  tended  to  increase  several  years  prior  to  failure.  However,  the 
results  in  Tables  la  and  lb  suggest  that  cost  efficiency  in  failed  banks  began  to  fall,  or  was 
already  at  a  subpar  level,  before  noncurrent  loans  reached  critical  levels.  Each  of  the  six 
subsamples  fall  into  one  of  three  general  patterns.  In  the  first  pattern  (Southwest  1990, 
Southwest  1991,  and  nonsouthwest  1990),  Xindex  and  NC  decayed  at  about  the  same  rate 
over  time,  and  both  measures  became  significantly  different  from  regional  means 
8 approximately  simultaneously.  In the  second  pattern  (nonSouthwest  1991 and  nonsouthwest 
1992),  both  Xindex  and  NC  gradually  decayed  across  the  entire  six year  period,  but Xindex 
became  significantly  different  from  regional  means  either  one  or two  years  earlier  than  did 
NC.  In the  third  pattern  (Southwest  1992),  Xindex  was significantly  lower  than  regional 
means  during  each  of the  six years  prior  to failure,  but NC dis  not  begin  to  increase  until 
three  years  before  failure,  and did  not become  significantly  greater  than  the  regional  mean 
until  the  year  before  failure. 
Although  these  results  are  crude,  they  are  consistent  with  the  “management  quality” 
theory  of bank  failure  extended  above,  i.e.,  that  banks  with  low  levels  of operating  efficiency 
are  also  more  likely  to have  poor  underwriting  and/or  loan  monitoring  practices,  resulting 
(eventually)  in more  bad assets  and  a higher  likelihood  of failure.  Of course,  alternate 
explanations  of these  results  are  possible.’  Future  research  might  on this  topic  might, 
following  from  Mester  (1994),  attempt  to control  for  monitoring  costs  when  estimating  cost 
efficiency  measures. 
2.  Efficiency  and  Corporate  Reorganizations 
Roughly  half  of the  reduction  in commercial  banks  since  1985 can  be accounted  for 
by  intra-holding  company  mergers  of affiliate  banks--in  other  words,  corporate 
reorganizations.  The  effect  of these  reorganizations  has been  to reduce  the  number  of 
9 For  example,  loans  do  not  move  to  noncurrent  status  until  they  are  nonperforming  for  90  days.  If  loans 
typically  are  30  to  60  days  past  due  for,  say,  nine  months  prior  to  becoming  noncurrent,  banks  may  also  incur 
increased  monitoring  costs--and  hence  show  increased  cost  inefficiency--nine  months  prior  to  showing  an 
increase  in  noncurrent  loans. 
9 affiliate  banks  in  multi-bank  holding  companies  (MBHCs),  or  in  some  cases  to  completely 
transform  these  firms  into  one-bank  holding  companies  (OBHCs). 
The  choice  of  organizational  form  can  be  an  important  determinant  of  the  efficiency  of 
a company’s  operations.  Observers  often  argue  that  the  overhead  required  to  maintain 
multiple  affiliates  can  be  a costly  drag  on  performance.  Historically,  however,  considerations 
other  than  efficiency  have  influenced  banking  companies’  choice  of  an  organizational  form. 
that 
By  choosing  to  organize  as  a  MBHC,  a bank  could  avoid  legal  constraints  on  both  the 
geographic  scope  of  its  operations  and  the  breadth  of  its  product  offerings--advantages 
could  outweigh  any  intrinsic  efficiency  disadvantages. 
Several  recent  developments  have  affected  this  tradeoff.  The  first  is  the  easing  in 
many  states  of  restrictions  on  intra-state  branching.  Most  companies  responded,  in  varying 
degrees  and  at  different  rates  over  time,  by  consolidating  all  of  their  existing  subsidiaries  into 
branch  banks.  lo  This  has  not  been  the  universal  response,  however,  to  the  elimination  of 
branching  restrictions.  Some  MBHCs  elected  to  merge  only  some--and  in  some  cases  none-- 
of  their  bank  subsidiaries.  The  variety  of  responses  suggests  actual  or  perceived  differences 
in  the  efficiency  benefits  of  complete  consolidation. 
The  second  development  is  the  increase  in  competition  in  virtually  all  of  the  product 
and  geographic  markets  in  which  banks  operate.  One  of  the  effects  of  increased  rivalry  is 
pressure  on  banks  to  improve  efficiency.  The  large  number  of  intra-holding  company 
consolidations  that  have  occurred  independent  of changes  in branching  laws  suggests  that  this 
lo It is  not  uncommon  for  companies  to  maintain  two  bank  subsidiaries  rather  than  one.  Typically,  one  will  be 
relatively  small  and  have  a different  charter  type  than  the  larger  subsidiary.  This  allows  companies  to  fully 
exploit  existing  or  future  advantages  associated  with  state  or  Federal  charters. 
10 type  of  reorganization  is perceived  by  the  companies  involved  as  enhancing  efficiency. 
2. I  htra-Compaq  Consolihtion  and E_tjicienq 
The  seminal  work  on  the  relationship  between  organizational  form  and  firm 
performance  is presented  by  Williamson  (1970).  Williamson  argues  that  firms  with  a 
multidivisional  structure,  like  MBHCs,  will  usually  outperform  alternatively  structured  rivals. 
Williamson’s  discussion  indicates  that  the  he  expects  that  the  source  of  the  superior 
performance  would  be  greater  X-efficiency,  although  he  does  not  use  the  term.  In  addition, 
he  emphasizes  that  optimal  performance  depends  not  only  on  the  existence  of  a  multi- 
divisional  structure,  but  also  on  which  decisions  and  functions  are  centralized,  and  which  are 
located  at  the  division  level. 
The  exact  nature  of  the  relationship  between  organizational  form  and  performance  in 
banking  firms  remains  unclear.  Intra-company  consolidation  will  enhance  organizational 
performance  if  it permits  holding  companies  to  significantly  lower  costs.  Cost  savings  might 
materialize  if  organizations  consisting  of  a  single  bank  with  branches  are  more  able  to  exploit 
size-related  economies  than  are  MBHCs.  Intra-company  consolidation  might  also  lower  costs 
by  facilitating  improvements  in  X-efficiency.  Banking  researchers  usually  attribute  inter-bank 
differences  in  X-efficiency  to  “superior  management,  ” but  it  is  possible  that  some  of  this 
difference  is  attributable  to  differences  in  organizational  form.  Achieving  optimal  X- 
efficiency  may  require  combining  separate,  semi-autonomous  operating  subsidiaries  into  a 
OBHC  with  branches. 
However,  intra-company  consolidation  of  subsidiary  banks  could  have  neutral  or  even 
11 adverse  impacts  on  costs.  MBHCs  might  realize  the  bulk  of  any  potential  scale  economies  by 
centralizing  decisions  and  functions.  In  this  type  of  merger,  branch  offices  are  not  typically 
closed--an  often  cited  source  of  cost  savings  in  inter-company  transactions.”  Gains  in 
operating  efficiency  might  be  offset  by  increased  “coordination  costs.”  In  addition,  there  is 
no  guarantee  that  the  quality  of  parent  company  management  is  significantly  better  than  that 
of  its  bank  subsidiaries. 
It  is  also  possible  that  intra-company  consolidation  could  improve  performance  by 
increasing  revenues.  A  consolidated  organization  might  hold  fewer  low  risk,  low  yielding 
assets  than  would  separate  affiliate  banks--although  a  MBHC  might  also  implement  this 
reallocation  by  exercising  centralized  control  over  subsidiary  bank  asset/liability  management. 
Intra-company  consolidations  are  not  likely,  however,  to  enhance  revenues  through  pricing 
changes  because  they  do  not  alter  local  market  structure. 
2.2  Recent  Empirical  Evidwce 
Empirical  evidence  on  the  performance  effects  of  intra-holding  company  mergers  is 
scarce.  Most  of  the  recent  research  on  bank  mergers  has  focused  on  mergers  between,  or 
acquisitions  of,  unaffiliated  institutions. 
In  a recent  study,  Newman  and  Shrieves  (1993)  attempted  to  investigate  Williamson’s 
hypothesis  using  1988  data  and  a  sample  of  over  1700  banks.  They  examined  differences  in 
operating  efficiency  for  MBHC  subsidiary  banks  relative  to  both  OBHC  subsidiaries  and 
independent  banks.  A  critical  assumption  in  their  study  is  that  all  MBHC’s  approximate 
”  For  evidence  on  differences  in  holding  company  centralization  see  Whalen  ( 1981). 
12 Williamson’s  M-form  structure.  The  authors  organize  their  sample  into  four  revenue  classes, 
and  use  a cost  frontier  approach  to  estimate  efficiency  measures  for  each  bank  in  each 
revenue  class.  They  find  that  MBHC  subsidiaries  are  more  efficient  than  independent  banks 
in  the  three  smallest  revenue  classes,  but  that  OBHC  banks  are  more  efficient  than 
independents  only  in  the  smallest  revenue  class.  Consistent  with  these  results,  MBHC  banks 
were  signiftcantly  more  efficient  than  OBHC  banks  in  each  of  the  two  middle  revenue 
classes.  No  significant  differences  in  efficiency  across  organizational  forms  were  found  for 
banks  in  the  largest  revenue  class.  The  authors  also  generate  a mean  efficiency  level  at  each 
of  the  banking  companies  in  their  sample  by  aggregating  the  efficiency  measures  of  the 
subsidiary  banks  in  each  organization.  Using  pair-wise  tests,  they  find  that  the  mean 
efficiency  of  OBHCs  is  significantly  better,  while  the  mean  efficiency  of  MBHCs  is  no 
different,  than  that  of  independent  banks.  Thus,  this  study  finds  that  organizational  form 
affects  bank  efficiency  without  concluding  that  any  single  form  is  optimal.  l2 
DeYoung  (1993)  uses  a thick  cost  frontier  to  estimate  pre-  and  postmerger  cost 
inefficiency  in  348  mergers  approved  by  the  OCC  in  1987  and  1988.  This  study  examines 
only  mergers  that  involved  two  banks,  and  includes  (unlike  most  bank  merger  studies) 
acquisitions  by  “active”  firms  that  made  additional  purchases  in  the  years  immediately  before 
or  after  the  observed  acquisition.  Forty-three  percent  of  the  observed  mergers  were  within- 
holding  company  reorganizations.  Prior  to  the  merger,  the  acquiring  affiliate  in  these  intra- 
I2 Newman  and Shrieves  assumed  that all of the MBHCs  in their  sample had the same  “real” organizational 
form.  Survey  evidence,  however,  has consistently  demonstrated  that the degree  of centralized  control  exercised 
by MBHC  parent  companies  over  the decisions  and operations  of their  subsidiary  banks varies  considerably 
across  holding  companies.  Whalen  (1983)  found  bank profitability  to be significantly  greater  at subsidiaries  of 
MBHCs  that exercised  a higher  degree  of centralized  control,  evidence  that  “real” organizational  form,  even 
within  the same nominal  structure,  can have  an impact on bank performance. 
13 company  mergers  was  more  cost  efficient  than  the  target  affiliate  only  42  percent  of  the  time. 
In  contrast,  acquirers  in  mergers  of  unrelated  banks  were  more  cost  efficient  than  their 
targets  64  percent  of  the  time.  Although  these  premerger  results  suggest  that  intra-company 
mergers  are  less  likely  than  inter-company  mergers  to  produce  efficiency  gains,  postmerger 
(three  years  after  the  merger)  cost  efficiency  improved  in  about  64  percent  of  the  intra- 
company  mergers  compared  to  only  54  percent  of  the  mergers  of  unrelated  institutions. 
When  mergers  involving  “active”  banks  were  excluded,  however,  cost  efficiency  improved  in 
only  56  percent  and  43  percent,  respectively,  of  the  observed  transactions.  (Section  3 
contains  further  discussion  of  this  study.) 
Linder  and  Crane  (1992)  examine  the  pre-  and  postmerger  performance  of  all  bank 
mergers  in  New  England  from  1982  through  1987.  Of  the  47  cases  in  their  complete  sample, 
25  were  intracompany  mergers  of  previously  owned  affiliates.  The  authors  calculated  a 
variety  of  performance  measures  for  both  merger  partners  on  a pro  forma  basis  one  year 
prior  to  each  merger,  and  one  year  and  two  years  after  the  merger  for  the  merged  entity. 
Relative  to  their  peers,  more  than  three-quarters  of  the  banks  involved  in  intracompany 
mergers  improved  their  ROA  one  year  after  the  merger,  and  this  improvement  was  sustained 
during  the  second  postmerger  year.  Improvements  in  net  interest  margin,  related  to  pricing 
changes,  were  determined  to  be  the  source  of  the  increase  in  ROA  for  these  mergers. 
Although  the  banks  involved  in  intracompany  mergers  were  found  to  have  below-industry 
profitability  in  the  year  prior  to  merger  and  so  had  more  room  to  improve  their  performance, 
Linder  and  Crane  report  that  intraholding  mergers  out-performed  mergers  of  newly  acquired 
banks  even  after  this  factor  is  taken  into  account.  The  authors  also  found  that  the  ratio  of 
14 noninterest  expense  to  assets  increased  postmerger  relative  to  peers  for  both  types  of  mergers, 
a  finding  that  is  not  consistent  with  improved  efficiency. 
2.3  Evidence from  capital  markets 
Whalen  (1994)  uses  a  standard  event  study  methodology  to  investigate  the  impact  of 
intra-company  consolidation  on  stockholder  wealth.  The  critical  event  in  this  study  is  the 
first  public  announcement  by  a MBHC  of  its  intention  to  consolidate  substantially  all  of  its 
subsidiary  banks,  effectively  transforming  itself  into  a  OBHC  with  branches.  Significant 
positive  abnormal  returns  around  this  event  date  would  suggest  that  the  announced 
consolidation  is  expected  to  boost  future  profitability--through  cost  efficiencies,  revenue 
increases,  or  both--thus  enhancing  the  wealth  of  holding  company  shareholders.  The  absence 
of  significant  positive  returns  around  the  event  date  would  suggest  that  investors  believe  that 
the  optimal  organization  form  can  be  reached  without  a complete  consolidation  of  affiliate 
banks. 
The  advantage  of  this  research  methodology  (as  opposed  to  one  that  analyzes 
accounting  data)  is  that  it yields  a  relatively  simple  estimate  of  the  expected  long  run  net 
impact  of  intra-company  consolidation  on  the  future  profitability  of  firms  making  this  type  of 
structural  change.  However,  this  approach  reveals  only  the  market’s  expectation  of  the 
impact  of  reorganization  on  future  profits,  rather  than  actual  profitability,  and  does  not 
identify  the  source  of  any  profitability  improvements  that  are  detected. 
Whalen’s  sample  consists  of  39  MBHCs  that  decided  to  consolidate  essentially  all  of 
15 their  subsidiary  banks  within  their  headquarters  state.  l3  These  consolidations  are  spread  over 
a  relatively  lengthy  time  period  spanning  the  years  1974  through  1993.  To  be  included  in 
the  sample  each  company  had  to  be  publicly  traded  and  have  a  readily  identifiable  premerger 
announcement  date.  Estimates  of  the  abnormal  returns  for  each  holding  company  were 
generated  using  a one  factor  market  model  and  stock  returns  for  the  period  beginning  90  days 
before,  and  ending  90  days  after,  each  company’s  event  date.14  Cross-sectional  averages  of 
abnormal  and  standardized  abnormal  returns  for  the  sample  were  calculated  for  each  day  over 
the  examination  period  and  were  also  summed  over  various  meaningful  segments  of  event 
time  to  produce  cumulative  average  abnormal  return  (CAAR)  measures.  The  sign,  size  and 
statistical  significance  of  these  average  and  cumulative  average  return  measures  indicate  the 
capital  market’s  estimate  of  the  wealth  impact  of  MBHC  consolidation. 
The  key  results  are  presented  in  Tables  2  and  3.  In  both  tables,  results  are  presented 
for  the  complete  sample  as  well  as  for  a  subsample  that  excludes  companies  with  interstate 
bank  subsidiaries. 
Table  2  contains  average  abnormal  returns  (AAR)  and  associated  test  statistics  for  the 
period  beginning  3 days  before  and  ending  3 days  after  the  event  date  (t=O).  Looking  first 
r3 Nine  of  these  MBHCs  owned  subsidiary  banks  outside  of  their  headquarters  state  that  were  not  part  of  the 
announced  reorganization.  In  addition,  several  of  the  holding  companies  in  the  sample  consolidated  all  but  one 
of  their  subsidiaries  into  a  large  lead  bank  holding  more  than  90  percent  of  the  banking  assets  of  the  company, 
leaving  one  smaller  unconsolidated  bank  affiliate  (typically  with  a different  charter  than  the  lead  bank). 
I4 The  market  model  equations  were  estimated  using  OLS  over  a  80  day  estimation  period  beginning  11 days 
after,  and  ending  90  days  after,  each  company’s  announcement  date.  Alternately,  the  coefficients  were 
estimated  using  a  statistical  technique  that  corrects  for  problems  related  to  non-synchronous  trading.  Results 
obtained  using  a preannouncement  day  estimation  period  (beginning  90  days  before  and  ending  11 days  before 
the  announcement  date)  and  a combined  pre-  and  post-announcement  date  period  (the  entire  period  from  90  days 
before  to  90  days  after  the  announcement  date  with  the  exception  of  the  21  day  period  immediately  surrounding 
it)  were  also  analyzed.  The  results  obtained  in  every  case  are  basically  the  same  as  those  reported  in  the  paper. 
16 at  the  results  for  the  complete  sample,  the  tests  indicate  significant  and  positive,  although 
small,  average  abnormal  returns  on  days  t-2  and  t-l.  The  average  return  on  day  t =0  is 
positive  but  not  significant.  The  same  pattern  occurs  when  companies  with  interstate  banking 
subsidiaries  are  excluded.  A  reasonable  explanation  for  this  pattern  is  that  the  market  had 
information  on  the  consolidation  one  or  two  days  prior  to  date  it  appeared  in  the  financial 
press.  Comparing  the  average  return  figures  for  the  full  sample  and  the  subsample  on  these 
three  days  shows  a  somewhat  larger  positive  response  for  the  companies  that  consolidated 
basically  all  of  their  existing  banking  subsidiaries  (i.e.,  those  without  interstate 
operations). 
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Table  3 contains  cumulative  average  abnormal  returns  calculated  over  a  variety  of 
narrow  and  wide  time  intervals.  l5  For  narrow  intervals  near  the  event  date,  the  CAAR 
figures  for  both  samples  are  positive  and  the  z-statistics  indicate  that  they  are  significantly 
different  from  zero.  Thus,  the  empirical  results  are  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that 
consolidation  generally  enhances  shareholder  wealth.  Though  statistically  significant,  these 
CAAR  figures  are  not  large,  suggesting  that  the  performance  effects  of  consolidation  are 
relatively  modest.  CAAR  over  wider  pre-  and  post-announcement  time  intervals  are  not 
significantly  different  from  zero,  suggesting  that  the  abnormal  returns  observed  around  t =0 
are  in  fact  attributable  to  the  announced  event. 
The  pattern  and  size  of  the  abnormal  returns  around  the  announcement  day  varied 
considerably  from  company  to  company.  To  obtain  insight  on  the  determinants  of  these 
inter-company  differences,  the  cumulative  standardized  return  for  each  company  over  the  t-2 
I5 The  test  statistics  were  constructed  following  Linn  and  McConnell  (1983). 
17 to t=O  interval  was regressed  on  alternative  sets of variables  hypothesized  to  influence  the 
benefits  and/or  costs  of consolidation.‘6  The  regression  results  identified  three  variables  as 
having  a significant  impact  on abnormal  returns.  First,  returns  to consolidation  were 
positively  related  to the  number  of subsidiaries  consolidated,  with  positive  returns  to an 
additional  bank  occurring  only  in reorganizations  involving  16 or more  banks.  Second, 
larger  returns  were  found  for  companies  whose  lead  bank  was larger  than  $1 billion  but 
smaller  than  $10 billion  in total  assets.  Third,  returns  to consolidation  were  negatively 
related  to the  average  size of the  non-lead  bank  subsidiaries  that  were  consolidated.  Returns 
were  not  significantly  related  to efficiency,  profitability,  the  year  of consolidation,  or  the 
extent  of  interstate  banking  operations. 
The  statistically  significant  and positive  abnormal  returns  detected  here  suggest  that 
intra-company  consolidation  within  state boundaries  can  be expected  to significantly  improve 
future  profitability.  Admittedly,  these  findings  reflect  investor  expectations  and  are  based  on 
the  analysis  of a relatively  small  sample,  but they  are  robust  with  respect  to changes  in 
estimation  period  and estimation  techniques,  are  consistent  with  the  intrastate  trend  toward 
branch  banking  (as opposed  to retaining  MBHC  forms),  and complement  the  empirical 
evidence  reported  by  DeYoung  and  Linder-Crane. 
While  the  analysis  suggests  that  consolidation  of holding  companies  across  state  lines 
could  also  yield  efficiencies  and enhance  profitability,  such a conclusion  is tentative  at best. 
It may  be that  further  material  performance  gains  might  not be possible  for  interstate  MBHCs 
that  have  already  consolidated  within  the boundaries  of each  of the  states  in which  they 
I6 See Whalen  (1994)  for  the full results  of these  regressions, 
18 operate.  This  possibility  is  supported  by  discussions  in  the  trade  press,  as  well  as  the  rather 
rudimentary  regression  results  reported  above  which  indicate  larger  abnormal  returns  for 
companies  that  consolidate  a considerable  number  of  relatively  small  subsidiary  banks  into 
moderately  sized  lead  banks.  l7 
3.  Efficiency  and Mergers  & Acquisitions 
About  25  percent  of  the  commercial  banks  that  disappeared  between  1986  through 
1992  were  acquired  by  other  banking  organizations.  Given  the  high  degree  of  cost 
inefficiency  observed  in  the  industry,  one  would  expect  that  at  least  some  of  these 
acquisitions  were 
the  bank  mergers 
motivated  by  efficiency  concerns.  Like  corporate  reorganizations,  some  of 
in  the  1980s  may  have  been  motivated  by  the  postmerger  opportunity  to 
eliminate  duplicate  overhead.  Other  mergers  may  have  allowed  banks  to  achieve  a more 
optimal  size,  product  mix,  or  geographic  coverage.  Still  others  may  have  been  designed  to 
generate  profits  by  improving  the  operating  efficiency  of  the  cost-inefficient  banks  acquired. 
Banking  companies  may  also  be  motivated  to  acquire  other  banks  for  non-efficiency 
reasons.  Growth  into  new  markets  is  often  easier  via  a market  extension  merger  rather  than 
through  de rwvo entry.  Market  extension  mergers  may  better  situate  a bank  to  take 
advantage  of  the  likely  relaxation  of  interstate  branching  restrictions.  Banks  might  enhance 
their  profitability  via  intra-market  mergers  that  increase  their  market  power.  Bank  managers 
may  simply  be  motivated  by  their  desire  to  run  a  larger  banking  empire. 
”  See  Barton  Crockett,  “Cost  Savings  From  Branching  May  Fall  Short,”  American  Banker,  March  15,  1994  for 
a discussion. 
19 What  does  the  existing  research  on  inter-bank  mergers  and  acquisitions  reveal  about 
the  motivation  for  bank  acquisitions  ?  Do  efficiency  gains  appear  to  be  a major  motivation? 
If  so,  did  the  bank  merger  wave  of  the  past  decade  materially  enhance  the  efficiency  of  the 
industry?  Finally,  will  the  inter-bank  mergers  and  acquisitions  of  the  next  decade  resemble 
the  mergers  of  the  past  decade? 
3. I  Sources  of potential  eficienq  gains  j-om  bank mergers 
There  is  substantial  evidence  that  mergers  can  reduce  costs  by  making  banks  larger, 
but  there  is  some  disagreement  about  the  range  of  bank  size  over  which  scale  economies 
occur.  Most  studies  have  found  that  the  bulk  of  scale  economies  are  captured,  but  not  fully 
exhausted,  by  the  time  a bank  has  $100  to  $200  million  in  assets,  but  McAllister  and 
McManus  (1993),  Ferrier  and  Love11 (1990),  and  Hunter  and  Timme  (1986)  all  find 
additional  scale  economies  for  banks  over  $1  billion  in  assets.  The  magnitude  of  these 
savings  also  varies  from  study  to  study.  Evanoff  and  Israilevich  (1991)  survey  the  banking 
scale  economy  literature,  and  show  that  the  estimated  cost  inefficiency  from  operating  at  sub- 
optimal  scale  can  be  as  little  as  3 percent,  or  as  much  as  40  percent,  of  total  costs. 
A  second  potential  source  of  merger-induced  savings  is  scope  economies.  However, 
the  existing  evidence  suggests  only  limited  synergies  for  banks  that  merge  in  order  to  expand 
their  product  offerings.  Clark  (1988)  and  Mester  (1987)  review  the  banking  scope  economy 
literature,  and  conclude  that  offering  a wide  range  of  products  does  not  give  a bank  a 
significant  cost  advantage  over  its  less  diversified  rivals. 
A  third  way  that  bank  mergers  might  generate  cost  savings  is  by  improving  productive 
20 efficiency  at  the  acquired  bank.  Evanoff  and  Israilevich  (1991)  and  Berger,  Hunter,  and 
Timme  (1993)  review  the  literature  on  productive  inefficiency,  or  X-inefficiency,  in  banks. 
These  studies  tend  to  find  that  the  typical  bank  incurs  expenses  that  are  20  percent  to  30 
percent  higher  than  the  most  efficient  banks  of  similar  size  and  product  mix,  levels  that 
dominate  the  potential  for  scale  and  scope  economies  in  most  banks.  If  differences  in  the 
abilities  of  bank  managers  are  the  sources  of  these  cost  disparities,  a merger  in  which 
managers  and/or  management  practices  at  an  X-inefficient  target  bank  are  replaced  by  the 
management  practices  of  an  X-efficient  acquiring  bank  might  generate  large  cost  savings. 
Bank  mergers  might  also  produce  efficiencies  that  enhance  revenues.  The  premerger 
pricing  scheme  at  the  target  bank  may  not  have  been  maximizing  revenues,  and  might  be 
adjusted  postmerger.  A  larger  postmerger  bank  may  be  able  to  hold  a  somewhat  riskier,  and 
thus  higher  yielding,  portfolio  of  assets.  The  postmerger  bank  may  be  able  to  offer  a broader 
product  line,  thus  offering  “one-stop  shopping”  to  its  customers. 
3.2  Existing  empirical  evidence  on p&merger  eficiencies 
To  the  extent  that  bank  merger  studies  have  detected  postmerger  improvements  in 
bank  performance,  the  improvements  have  been  revenue  enhancements  rather  than  cost 
savings.  Furthermore,  when  studies  have  identified  the  premerger  potential  for  cost  savings, 
there  has  been  no  evidence  that  this  potential  is  systematically  realized. 
In  a multi-equation  regression  model  that  controls  for  branching  laws,  market 
structure,  bank  size  and  risk  characteristics,  and  executive  compensation,  Shranz  (1993)  finds 
that,  on  average,  profit  margins  (pretax  income/revenue)  are  12 percentage  points  higher  in 
21 states  that  do  not  restrict  acquisitions  by  multibank  holding  companies.  Although  this  study 
does  not  examine  the  results  of  actual  bank  mergers,  its  results  suggest  that  banks  tend  to 
operate  more  efficiently  when  the possibility  of  takeover  exists.  Regardless,  stock  market 
evidence  from  actual  mergers  finds  that  mergers  of  publicly-traded  banks  do  create  value. 
An  exhaustive  stock  market  event  study  of  bank  mergers  by  Hawawini  and  Swary  (1990) 
found  wealth  effects  similar  to  those  found  in  event  studies  of  mergers  between  nonbanks, 
i.e.,  target  bank  stockholders  received  significant  positive  abnormal  returns  that  exceeded  the 
slightly  negative  abnormal  returns  to  acquiring  bank  shareholders,  resulting  in  an  increase  in 
net  aggregate  shareholder  wealth.  These  studies,  however,  measure  only  the  market’s 
expectation  that  mergers  will  improve  future  performance,  and  do  not  identify  the  underlying 
reasons  for  these  increases  in  wealth. 
Benston,  Hunter,  and  Wall  (1992)  found  that  the  acquisition  price  premium  in  bank 
mergers  was  positively  related  to  acquiring  bank  efficiency  (measured  by  the  ratio  of  market 
to  book  value)  and  negatively  related  to  target  bank  efficiency,  suggesting  that  the  market  for 
corporate  control  of  banks  expected  efficient  managers  to  be  able  to  improve  the  performance 
of  targets  previously  run  by  inefficient  managers.  Shaffer  (1993)  used  thick  frontier 
techniques  to  simulate  “megamergers”  (mergers  in  which  both  banks  have  over  $1  billion  in 
assets)  between  actual  banks  under  various  assumptions  about  the  postmerger  transfer  of 
efficiency.  In  hypothetical  merger  scenarios  that  paired  cost-efficient  banks  with 
cost-inefficient  banks,  significant  savings  resulted  when  it  was  assumed  that  100  percent  of 
the  cost  efficiency  difference  was  eliminated  after  the  merger. 
These  studies  suggest  that  many  bank  mergers  hold  the  potential  for  improved  cost 
22 efficiency,  but  this  potential  does  not  sytematically  translate  into  postmerger  cost  savings.  In 
a  study  of  57  megamergers,  Berger  and  Humphrey  (1992)  used  regression  residuals  to  rank 
the  cost  efficiency  of  merging  banks  against  all  nonmerging  megabanks.  Most  of  these 
mergers  showed  the  potential  for  efficiency  gains  (i.e.,  acquiring  banks  were  more  X-efficient 
than  their  targets);  however,  this  potential  was  not  systematically  exploited  after  the  merger. 
Fixler  and  Zieschang  (1993)  used  index  numbers  to  compare  the  productivity  (output  as  a 
ratio  of  inputs)  of  banks  that  merged  to  the  productivity  of  hypothetical  reference  banks 
having  similar  characteristics  and  found  similar  results. 
A  large  number  of  studies  have  examined  premerger  and  postmerger  financial  ratios 
such  as  operating  margins,  return  on  assets  and/or  equity,  and  loans  or  noninterest  expenses 
to  total  assets.  Consistent  with  the  studies  of  bank  mergers  and  X-inefficiency,  Linder  and 
Crane  (1992),  Srinivasan  (1992),  O’Keefe  (1992),  and  Spong  and  Shoenhair  (1992)  all  find 
no  strong  postmerger  improvement  in  financial  ratios  at  merging  banks.  These  results  are  not 
universal,  however.  Cornett  and  Tehranian  (1992)  studied  a  set  of  30  large  mergers  and 
found  that,  relative  to  nonmerging  banks,  postmerger  ROE  increased,  but  postmerger  ROA 
did  not  increase.  Spindt  and  Tarhan  (1991,  1993)  find  significant  postmerger  improvements 
in  ROE,  operating  margin,  expenditures  on  employees,  and  in  some  cases  ROA. 
3.3  Interpreting  the evidence 
In  general,  the  lack  of  systematic  evidence  of  efficiency  gains  from  bank  mergers 
argues  strongly  that  cost  savings  were  not  the  predominant  motive  for  bank  mergers  during 
the  past  decade.  Berger  and  Humphrey  (1992)  suggest  that  the  dearth  of  measured 
23 post-merger  efficiency  gains  during  the  1980s  points  to  asset  growth  or  geographic  expansion 
as  the  motivation  for  many  of  these  mergers.  Mester  (1994)--inferring  from  cost-cutting 
goals  announced  at  the  time  of  the  mergers--suggests  that  the  motives  for  acquiring  banks  in 
the  1990s  may  have  shifted  toward  efficiencies  gains,  while  mergers  in  the  1980s  often  stated 
market  extension  and  growth  as  their  objectives.  When  external  growth  is  the  motivation  for 
making  acquisitions,  acquirers  may  target  franchises  with  attributes  that  will  ease  the 
acquirer’s  entry  into  a  new  geographic  market,  such  as  extensive  branch  networks.  These 
targets  may  in  fact  be  cost-inefficient  (for  example,  the  targets  may  be  over-branched),  and  as 
a result  appear  to  offer  “potential”  for  efficiency  gains.  However,  access  to  new  customers  is 
essential  to  establishing  a  new  regional  franchise,  and  cutting  excess  costs  by  closing 
branches  will  reduce  that  access. 
If  these  observations  are  accurate,  they  suggest  the  possibility  of  a two-part  strategy 
for  mergers  of  non-affiliated  banks.  In  the  first  step,  banks  get  a toehold  through  a market 
extension  purchase  of  a bank  with  an  extensive  branch  network.  The  acquiring  company 
might  for  a period  of  time  operate  the  target  as-is  (i.e.,  with  excess  labor  and  excess  branch 
locations  remaining  in  place)  in  order  to  preserve  existing  customer  relationships  and 
establish  brand  presence  in  the  new  market.  Once  customer  loyalty  has  been  solidified, 
moves  to  cut  costs--reducing  office  hours  or  eliminated  branch  locations--could  be  made  at 
less  risk  to  the  value  of  the  acquired  franchise. 
DeYoung  (1993)  contains  some  evidence  consistent  with  this  two-part  merger  strategy 
scenario.  Table  4  reports  a portion  of  his  results  for  105  acquisitions  made  by  national  banks 
in  1987  and  1988.  These  105  mergers  were  single-target,  intra-state  acquisitions  of  solvent 
24 banks  by  acquiring  banks  that  had  not made  any  other  acquisitions  three  years  after  or two 
years  before.  These  transactions  are  split  into  two groups  in Table  4,  which  shows  pre-  and 
postmerger  efficiency  results  for  61  “acquisitions”  of banks  in the  same  holding  company  as 
the  acquiring  bank  (i.e.,  corporate  reorganizations)  and 44 acquisitions  of unrelated  banks. 
There  are  two  measures  of X-efficiency  reported  for  each  group  of mergers  in Table 
4.  Xassets  equals  X-inefficiency  per  dollar  of assets,  and  is derived  from  a thick  cost  frontier 
model.18  Xindex  is based  on Xassets  and  is uniformly  distributed  from  0.0  for  the  most  X- 
inefficient  bank  to  1.0 for  the most  X-efficient  bank.  Both Xindex  and  Xassets  were 
estimated  separately  for  the  target  bank  and the  acquiring  bank  the  year  prior  to the  merger, 
and for  the  combined  bank  three  years  after  the  merger.  To determine  whether  a merger 
enhanced  efficiency,  postmerger  Xindex  (or Xassets)  was compared  to the  asset-weighted 
average  of Xindex  (or Xassets)  for  the  acquirer  and target  banks. 
The  results  are  markedly  different  for  the  two different  categories  of mergers.  The 
target  bank  was  less efficient  than  its acquirer  in 32 of the 44 mergers  of unrelated  banks. 
Acquiring  banks  averaged  in the  56th efficiency  percentile  with  an average  of  $.0089  of 
excess  costs  per  dollar  of assets,  while  targets  averaged  in only  the 44th  efficiency  percentile 
with  an average  of  $.0130  of excess  costs  per  dollar  of assets.  In both  cases,  the  means  were 
different  from  each  other  at the  10 percent  level  of significance  Although  these  premerger 
results  are  consistent  with  mergers  that  are  motivated  by the  chance  to make  efficiency  gains 
at a poorly  managed  target,  the  transactions  did  not  systematically  deliver  postmerger 
efficiency  gains.  Postmerger  Xasset  improved  by  a nonsignificant  amount,  and postmerger 
I8 The  model  is  virtually  identical  to  that  used  in  Section  1 of  this  paper,  with  the  exception  of  the  output  vector. 
See  DeYoung  (1993)  for  a  complete  description  of  this  model. 
25 Xindex  actually  fell. 
In  contrast,  in  the  majority  of  intraholding  company  mergers  the  “target”  affiliate 
tended  to  be  more  X-efficient  than  its  “acquirer.”  Furthermore--consistent  with  Whalen’s 
results  reported  in  section  2--both  Xasset  and  Xindex  improved  after  these  transactions. 
Postmerger  Xasset  improved  in  33,  and  postmerger  Xindex  improved  in  34,  of  these  61 
transactions.  Mean  Xasset  improved  from  $.0117  to  $.0086  per  asset  dollar,  and  Xindex 
improved  from  the  48th  to  the  50th  efficiency  percentile,  although  neither  of  these  changes 
was  significantly  different  from  zero. 
These  results  suggest  that  intra-company  mergers  and  inter-company  mergers  in  the 
1980s  were  motivated  by  different  objectives,  at  least  in  the  short-run.  Acquisitions  of 
unrelated  banks  had  the  potential  for  cost  efficiencies,  but  did  not  enhance  postmerger 
efficiency  within  three  years.  This  is  what  we  would  expect  to  observe  if  the  primary 
motivations  are  market  extension  and  customer  retention  in  these  new  markets.  In  contrast, 
average  postmerger  X-efficiency  improved  in  intraholding  company  mergers,  although  the 
change  was  not  statistically  significant.  Because  market  extension  is  not  a possible  motivation 
for  intra-company  mergers,  cost  savings  might  be  more  likely  in  these  mergers. 
4.  Industry  Consolidation  in the  Next  Decade:  Strategies  for Banks  and  Regulators 
Overall,  the  evidence  presented  in  the  previous  three  sections  suggests  that  the 
banking  industry  has  become  more  efficient  as  it  has  consolidated.  We  have  seen  evidence 
that  cost  inefficient  banks  fail  at  higher  rates  than  do  efficient  banks.  We  have  also  seen 
26 evidence  that  MBHC  consolidations  increase  the  value  of  the  firm.  Finally,  we  have  seen 
evidence  that  mergers  of  unrelated  banks  enhance  (expected  or  actual,  depending  on  the  study 
in  question)  postmerger  profitability,  and  may  hold  the  potential  for  gains  in  cost  efficiency  in 
the  future.  l9 
Given  the  increased  competitive  pressures  facing  banks,  the  efficiency  improvements 
that  have  already  been  captured  do  not  ensure  that  banks--or  a  least  banks  as  we  currently 
know  them--will  maintain  a profitable  niche  in  financial  services  markets.  Further  industry 
consolidation  may  be  inevitable  if  banks  are  to  remain  viable  producers  of  a  wide  variety  of 
financial  services. 
What  does  the  decade  ahead  promise  for  industry  consolidation  and  industry 
efficiency?  One  factor  that  will  obviously  shape  the  process  of  future  consolidation  is  the 
lifting  of  restrictions  on  interstate  branching.  But  much  also  depends  on  the  competitive 
positions  that  banks  choose  to  occupy  in  the  financial  services  industry.  How  might  banks 
best  shape  themselves  to  take  advantage  of  the  future  environment,  and  how  should  bank 
regulators  respond? 
4. I  W%at  should  banks do? 
Whatever  banks  do,  they  will  have  to  do  it more  efficiently.  The  evidence  presented 
above  confirms  the  obvious,  that  inefficient  business  firms  do  not  survive.  Efficiency 
I9 Although  the  evidence  presented  here  suggests  that  the  three  channels  of  consolidation  (failure,  reorganization, 
and  merger)  are  efficiency-enhancing,  not  all  studies  have  concluded  that  the  banking  industry  as  a whole 
became  more  efficient  during  the  consolidation  of  the  1980s.  Analysis  of  productivity  and  cost  efficiency  in 
banks  by  Bauer,  Berger,  and  Humphrey  (1993)  suggests  that  industry-wide  efficiency  remained  relatively 
constant  across  the  1980s.  On  the  other  hand,  Elyasiani  and  Mehdian  (1990)  found  evidence  that  the  industry- 
wide  production  frontier  shifted  inward  (i.e.,  productive  efficiency  increased)  between  1980  and  1985. 
27 supports  earnings  and,  in  the  worst  case,  helps  a bank  weather  potentially  fatal  economic 
shocks.  Growing  competition  from  other  depositories  and  nonbanks  makes  efficient  banking 
operations  critical  for  survival  in  the  next  decade.  Rationalizing  existing  corporate  structure, 
and  expanding  geographic  reach,  are  two  tactics  that  banking  companies  might  use  to  enhance 
efficiency. 
Much  of  what  banks  should  do  on  these  fronts  is  constrained  by  what  they  are 
permitted  to  do.  Restrictions  on  interstate  operations  are  currently  a binding  constraint  for 
many  banking  companies  that  already  own  banks  in  multiple  states  and  wish  to  consolidate 
their  organizations.  Although  many  banking  organizations  have  announced  their  intentions  to 
consolidate  their  affiliates  across  state  lines  as  soon  as  possible,  these  actions  are  dependent 
on  the  lifting  of  interstate  branching  restrictions. 
A  distinction  must  be  drawn  between  the  MBHC  consolidations  that  have  occurred  in 
the  past  and  those  that  interstate  branching  legislation  will  allow  in  the  future.  Although  the 
evidence  presented  here  suggests  that  consolidating  MBHCs  within  state  boundaries  has 
resulted  in  small  but  significant  efficiency  gains,  MBHCs  that  have  already  consolidated  in 
this  manner  may  have  exhausted  the  bulk  of  available  cost  savings.  Further  consolidation 
across  state  lines  may  yield  only  inconsequential  efficiency  gains  for  multi-state  MBHCs  that 
have  already  consolidated  each  of  their  within  state  operations.  Furthermore,  banks  should 
consider  whether  a consolidated  organization  is  consistent  with  their  basic  managerial 
approach.  Some  banking  organizations  that  have  chosen  not  to  consolidate  their  affiliates  into 
a  single  bank--Bane  One  is  the  example  generally  cited--have  been  very  successful. 
The  evidence  from  mergers  of  unrelated  banks  suggests  that  some  banks  have  made 
28 postmerger  efficiency  gains,  while  others  have  not--there  is  little  hard  evidence  on  what 
separates  the  two  groups.  The  lack  of  systematic  cost  savings  from  bank  mergers  may  be 
because  the  objectives  of  acquisitions  in  the  1980s  were  market  extension  rather  than  cost 
savings.  The  anecdotal  evidence,  as  well  as  the  research  presented  above,  is consistent  with 
this  reading  of  recent  bank  merger  activity.  In  the  next  decade,  banking  companies  might  do 
well  to  make  fewer  acquisitions  for  external  growth  and  concentrate  instead  on  extracting 
efficiencies  from  the  multi-bank  organizations  put  in  place  by  the  market  extension  mergers 
of  the  past  decade.  This  being  said,  the  expected  passage  of  some  form  of  interstate 
branching  legislation  has  accelerated  purchases  by  MBHCs  across  state  lines.  Even  if  such 
acquisitions  do  not  provide  productive  synergies  or  scale  economies,  they  may  eventually 
provide  an  opportunity  for  overhead  reduction  via  interstate  corporate  reorganization.  The 
success  of  these  acquisitions,  then,  hinges  to  a  large  extent  on  the  same  arguments  just 
discussed  concerning  corporate  reorganizations. 
Banking  companies  should  not  choose  organizational  structures  or  plot  acquisition 
strategies  without  considering  their  strategic  position  in  financial  services  markets.  Banks 
should  make  their  expansion  and  consolidation  plans  based  on  a  firm  understanding  of  their 
competitive  advantages  relative  to  other  bank  and  nonbank  financial  services  firms.  It  is 
possible  to  get  carried  away  with  efforts  to  cut  costs.  Cutting  waste  and  duplication  is  an 
ongoing  tactic  that  enhances  profitability  at  every  organization  regardless  of  its  competitive 
strategy.  At  some  point,  however,  cutting  costs  can  reduce  the  quality  or  range  of  services  a 
bank  can  provide  its  customers.  A  bank  has  to  ask  itself,  “given  the  strengths  and 
weaknesses  of  our  competitors,  is  the  most  profitable  strategy  for  us  to  become  the  low-cost 
29 provider  of  financial  services  in  our  market?” 
Because  banks  incur  some  expenses  that  their  competitors  do  not,  such  as  paying 
deposit  insurance  premiums  and  preparing  for  examinations  by  (often  multiple)  regulators,  it 
is  difficult  for  them  to  offer  generic,  commodity-type  services  at  competitive  prices.  Banks 
may  be  better  off  focussing  on  providing  fee-based  products  and  services,  preferably  to 
customers  willing  to  pay  extra  for  personal  service.20  The  actions  necessary  to  cut  costs  to 
the  bone--closing  branches,  shorter  hours,  fewer  customer  service  representatives,  lower 
salaries  (i.e.,  less  expertise)--reduce  a bank’s  abilities  to  attract  and  retain  the  business  of 
high-margin  customers  who  value  personal  relations  and  financial  expertise.  Banks  should 
consider  these  trade-offs  carefully  when  contemplating  cost  cuts  through  reorganization  or 
acquisition.  Banks  cannot  afford  to  be  blind  cost-cutters  without  regard  to  the  quality  and 
breadth  of  financial  services  necessary  to  maximize  profits. 
4.2  JT7mt  should  the regulators  do? 
Regulators,  as  well  as  bankers,  need  to  be  acutely  aware  of  the  critical  importance 
efficiency.  The  evidence  indicates  that  inefficient  banks  are  more  likely  to  require  closer 
supervisory  scrutiny  and  ultimately  fail,  perhaps  imposing  additional  costs  on  third  parties 
of 
in 
the  process.  But  more  importantly,  whatever  their  primary  purpose  (encouraging  safety  and 
soundness,  consumer  protection,  etc.),  the  constraints  imposed  by  regulators  can  affect  the 
ability  of  banks  to  compete  successfully  with  nonbank  firms  by  constraining  bank  efficiency. 
Regulatory  constraints  can  also  penalize  consumers  by  limiting  choice  and  by  raising  search 
*’ See  William  Isaac,  “Emphasizing  Low  Pirces  Over  Good  Service  is  a Risky  Strategy,”  American  Banker, 
February  16,  1994,  for  a discussion. 
30 and  transactions  costs. 
The  evidence  in this  paper  suggests  that  consolidation  can  result  in modest 
improvements  in bank  efficiency.  The  findings  indicate  that  banking  firms  benefited  when 
regulatory  constraints  on  intrastate  branching  and organizational  form  were  removed,  and  that 
further  (though  perhaps  smaller)  benefits  could  accrue  to multi-state  banking  companies  if 
interstate  branching  comes  to pass.  Similarly,  as expanded  powers  for  banks  to offer 
nontraditional  products  and  services  are  contemplated,  regulators  must  remain  mindful  that 
constraints  on organizational  form  and  geographic  reach  might  place  banks  at a competitive 
disadvantage  relative  to nonbanks  in these  areas.  In general,  regulators  must  recognize  the 
dangers  of  ignoring,  or trying  to suppress,  the  inexorable  pressure  of the  market  on banks  to 
take  the  steps necessary  to remain  viable  entities  going  forward. 
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35 Table  la 
Failures  of  Banks  in  Southwest  States  (Louisiana,  Oklahoma,  Texas),  1990  -  1992. 
NC  =  mean  ratio  of  noncurrent  loans  to  total  loans. 
Xindex  =  mean  efficiency  (1.0  for  most  efficient  bank;  =  0.0  for  most  inefficient  bank). 
Z  =  standardized  difference  between  population  and  sample  means,  where  bold type 
indicates  population  mean  and  sample  mean  are  significantly  different  at  the  5 percent  level. 
Years to Failure:  6  5  4  3  2  1 
Population  NC  2.32  3.12  4.53  4.81 
Sample NC  1.81  2.84  4.93  6.98 
Z  -1.98  -0.89  0.94  4.64 
Population  Xindex  .446  .434  .363  .334 
Sample Xindex  .471  .418  .339  -261 
Z  0.79  -0.51  -0.84  -2.74 
Failed  in 1991  (35  banks) 
Population  NC  3.12  4.53  4.81  4.65 
Sample NC  2.71  3.52  5.21  7.28 
Z  -0.91  -2.54  0.68  3.19 
Population Xindex  .435  -363  .334  .325 
Sample Xindex  -424  .352  .272  .246 
Z  -0.19  -0.21  -1.43  -2.22 




Population  Xindex 
Sample Xindex 
Z 
4.53  4.81  4.65  4.01  3.40  2.86 
3.60  5.19  2.97  4.11  5.07  7.67 
-1.21  0.37  -2.23  0.10  1.59  4.11 
.363  .334  .325  -337  .364  -399 
-282  .195  .243  -176  .213 
-2.02  -3.17  -2.02  -4.96  -4.08  -lo';: 
Failed  in 1990  (93  banks) 
4.65  4.01 
7.94  9.80 
6.93  11.03 
-325  .337 
.153  .lll 
-9.49  -12.45 
4.01  3.40 
6.46  8.97 
3.46  6.77 
.337  .364 
-203 
-4.52 
36 Table  lb 
Failures  of  Banks  in  nonsouthwest  States,  1990  -  1992. 
NC  =  mean  ratio  of  noncurrent  loans  to  total  loans. 
Xindex  =  mean  efficiency  (1.0  for  most  efficient  bank;  =  0.0  for  most  inefficient  bank). 
Z  =  standardized  difference  between  population  and  sample  means,  where  bold type 
indicates  population  mean  and  sample  mean  are  significantly  different  at  the  5 percent  level. 
Years to Failure:  6  5  4  3  2  1 
Population  NC  2.62  2.94  2.79  2.22  1.86 
Sample NC  3.86  5.43  6.56  5.74  7.52 
Z  1.73  2.40  3.70  3.70  4.81 
Population  Xindex  .513  .516  .535  -539  .538 
Sample Xindex  .334  .418  .350  .298  .248 







Failed  in 1991  (46  banks) 
Population  NC  2.94  2.79  2.22  1.86  1.78  1.87 
Sample NC  2.78  3.54  2.79  3.45  6.83  11.25 
Z  -0.38  1.18  1.23  3.04  8.11  9.89 
Population  Xindex  .516  .535  -539  .538  -531 
Sample Xindex  .525  -521  -446  .359  .242 
Z  0.18  -0.34  -2.07  -3.86  -8.33 
.525 
-St;: 
Failed  in 1992  (42  banks) 
Population  NC 
Sample NC 
Z 
2.79  2.22  1.86  1.78 
2.32  2.18  2.63  3.45 
-1.02  -0.11  1.47  3.23 
.535  .539  .538  .531 
.471  -424  -333  .250 
-1.30  -2.28  -4.60  -7.24 
1.87  1.89 
5.49  9.42 
4.83  7.67 
Population  Xindex 
Sample Xindex 
Z 
.525  .518 
.209  .073 
-8.74  -16.35 
Failed  in 1990  (30  banks) 
37 Table  2 
Average  Abnormal  Returns  (AAR). 
MBHC  Consolidations  between  1974 and  1993. 
Z  =  standard  normal  Z-statistic. 
Event 
DaY 
Ehtire  Sample  Non-Interstate  Subsample 
N = 39  N = 30 
Z  Z 
1; 
-00171  0.91  .00306  1.23 
-00286  2.83  .00705  3.27 
-1  -00611  2.18  .00664  2.30 
0  .00328  0.94  .00117  0.52 
2' 
-.00219  -0.16  -.00170  0.65 
-.00051  -0.46  -.00094  -0.51 
3  .00106  1.28  .00215  1.46 
Table  3 
Cumulative  Average  Abnormal  Returns  (CAAR). 
MBHC  Consolidations  between  1974 and  1993. 
Z  =  standard  normal  Z-statistic. 
Time 
Interval 
Entire  Sarfple  Non-Interstate  Subsample 
N = 39  N = 30 
Z  Z 
-90  to  -11  -.0393  -1.54  -.0469  -1.17 
-10 to  -3  -.0003  -0.22  -.0006  -0.19 
-2 to  -1  .0089  3.54  .0137  3.95 
-2to  0  .0122  3.44  .0149  3.52 
-lto  0  .0094  2.21  .0078  1.99 
+1to  +30  -.0187  -0.54  .0005  0.77 
+1  to  +90  -.0093  -0.03  .0053  0.43 
38 Table  4 
Pre-  and Postmerger  Efficiency  Comparisons. 
105 bank  mergers  occurring  in  1987 and  1988. 
Xasset  =  dollars  of X-inefficiency  per  dollar  of assets. 
Xindex  =  1.0 for  most  X-efficient  banks,  =  0.0  for  most  X-inefficient  bank. 
mean  mean 
Xindex  Xasset 
Premeqer: 








average  .4830 
.5021 
Acquirer more efficient  than target: 
26  25 




Postmeryer  more efficient  than premerger: 
34  33 
44 acquisitions  of unrelated  banks 
Premeqer: 
Acquiring bank  .5560* 
Target bank  .4368 
$.;;;;;* 
Asset weighted  .5420  $:00096 
Postmeryer: 
Combined  bank  -5095  s.00075 
Acquirer more efficient  than target: 
32  32 
Postmerger  more efficient  than premeqer: 
19  20 
* indicates  that the acquiring  bank mean is significantly  different from the 
target bank mean at the 10 percent level. 
39 